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Recent Decisions
Bankruptcy - Right Of Owner To Return Of Consigned
Merchandise In Preference To Trustee In Bankruptcy Even
Though The Consignor-Consignee Relationship Was Not
Recorded. In re Lexington Appliance Company, Inc., 202
F. Supp. 869 (D. Md. 1962). An appliance distributor delivered merchandise to the bankrupt dealer under an
agreement that permitted the dealer to return unsold
merchandise and only pay for that which was sold. The
Referee in Bankruptcy held that this arrangement was a
consignment so that title to merchandise in the bankrupt's
possession did not pass to the trustee and, when such
merchandise was sold at public auction after bankruptcy,
the distributor was entitled to the proceeds of the sale.
The trustee challenged this conclusion and further
claimed that because the bankrupt failed to record the
agency relationship, as provided by 1 MD. CODE (1957)
Art. 2, §§ 18-20, the merchandise was subject to levy by
creditors of the bankrupt and, therefor, title passed to
him as provided by the Bankruptcy Act, § 70(a) (5) (11
U.S.C.A. § 110, sub. a(5)).
The United States District Court affirmed the finding
of the Referee that the arrangement between the distributor and the bankrupt was in fact a consignment, and held
that failure to record the agency relationship did not result in the passage of title to the trustee of the bankrupt
consignee. In reaching the latter conclusion, the Court
resolved the conflict between In re Eichengreen, 18 F. 2d
101 (D. Md. 1927) (expressing the view that the failure
to record as provided by Art. 2, §§ 18-20, permits the
trustee to prevail over the consignor, affirmed on the
ground the arrangement was a conditional sale and not
a consignment, Reliance Shoe Co. v. Manly, 25 F. 2d 381
(1928)) and In re Sachs, 31 F. Supp. 799 (D. Md. 1929)
(reaching an opposite conclusion based on Art. 2, § 9
which permits the owner of any merchandise in the hands
of an agent to recover his merchandise from the trustee
of such agent in the event of the agent's insolvency in
preference to all other creditors). The Court adopted the
reasoning of In re Sachs, supra, stating that this case
"has been considered the Maryland law for thirty-three
years." This holding makes Art. 2, § 9 an exception to
Art. 2, §§ 18-20, and preserves the consignor's title to mer-
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chandise in the possession of a bankrupt consignee even
when the consignee fails to record the agency relationship.
For further reference see Arnold, The 1950 Amendment
To The Preference Section Of The Bankruptcy Act And
Maryland Law, 14 Md. L. Rev. 311, 331 et seq. (1954).

Constitutional Law - Consent To Search By Gratuitous
Bailee As Waiver Of Rights Of Bailor. United States v.
Eldridge, 302 F. 2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962). While defendant's
car was on loan to a friend, the police were notified that it
contained a stolen rifle. The police observed a rifle on the
back seat of the car and obtained a search warrant. Defendant's friend, however, voluntarily permitted the police
to search the car, including the trunk, and, as a result, the
police never executed the search warrant. While there
was no showing that the rifle was stolen, the police discovered two stolen Coast Guard handie-talkie radios readily
visible in the trunk. During subsequent trial, resulting in
conviction, for stealing the two radios, defendant sought
to exclude the radios from evidence contending, inter alia,
that the search violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and that these
rights were personal and could not be waived by a gratuitous bailee. The United States Court of Appeals held (2-1)
that the Fourth Amendment precludes only unreasonable
searches and seizures and that the bailee's consent made
the instant search a reasonable one. The Court reasoned
that since the bailee had a right to open the trunk incident
to normal use of the car, he had a right to open it in the
presence of police officers who then were able to observe
the stolen radios. The dissent felt that there was insufficient
privity between this bailor and bailee to imply authority
to consent to a search.
It has been stated that "[a] search is unreasonable
unless authorized by a valid search warrant, is incident to
a valid arrest, or is made in other exceptional circumstances which dispense with the need for a search warrant." Williams v. United States, 105 U.S. App. D.C. 41, 263
F. 2d 487, 488 (1959), and cases there cited. The owner of
property may waive his constitutional right to be secure
against unreasonable search and seizure and thus obviate
the need for a valid search warrant. See, e.g., Zap v. United
States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946); 4 ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (1957) § 1578. Moreover, a person in lawful possession of the articles seized, or the prem-
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ises on which they may be found may under proper circumstances consent to the search. See, Abel v. United
States, 362 U.S. 217, 240-241 (1960); Fredricksen v. United
States, 105 U.S. App. D.C. 262, 266 F. 2d 463 (1959); United
States v. Sferas, 210 F. 2d 69, 74 (7th Cir. 1954); 4 ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (1957)
§ 1579. Thus the problem facing the court in each case is
to determine what are "proper circumstances." The majority in the instant case was of the opinion that lawful
possession and control is the touchstone in determining the
validity of consent to a search by a third person, supra, p.
465, fn. 8. For further reference see 31 A.L.R. 2d 1078
(1953).

Contracts - Mitigation Of Damages Where Impossibility Occurred Subsequent To Breach. Model Vending,
Inc. v. Stanisci, 74 N.J. Super. 12, 180 A. 2d 393 (1962).
A contract giving plaintiff exclusive right to place vending
machines in defendant's bowling alley for a period of
five years was breached by defendant after eleven months.
Two years after defendant's breach the subject bowling
alley was completely destroyed by fire and was not restored. Plaintiff claimed damages based on loss of profits
for the entire contract term of five years. The Superior
Court held that destruction of defendant's premises by
fire rendered his performance impossible, and that, notwithstanding defendant's breach prior to the fire, plaintiff
could recover for loss of profits only up to the time of the
fire.
In the absence of a contrary provision, where the subject matter of a contract is unforseeably destroyed after
the making of the contract, rendering performance impossible, the promisor is generally discharged from his obligation. See 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS (1962) § 1321; 6
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1938) § 1946; 2 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 460; 12 AM. JuR., CONTRACTS,
§ 372. See dicta in Hammaker v. Schleigh, 157 Md. 652,
663, 147 A. 790 (1929). In limiting damages for loss of
profits to the period prior to the event causing the impossibility, the Court, in the instant case, relied on the
statement in 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1938)
§ 1967A, p. 5524 that where there has been a total breach
and a subsequent impossibility during the contract term,
"the amount of recovery should be limited if it can be
shown that the remaining performance due from the de-
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fendant after the breach would have been excused by

impossibility." See also 2 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932)
§ 457 and comment (d) p. 850. CORBIN represents the
contrary position: "Impossibility of performance caused
. . . by the destruction of specific subject matter is not
operative as a discharge if the breach for which suit is
brought occurred before there was any such impossibility."

6

CORBIN, CONTRACTS

(1962) § 1341, p. 407. The Court,

in the instant case, interpreted the latter section as applicable only when the impossibility occurred after the expiration of the time for performance. It should be noted
that if plaintiff had instituted suit at the time of the breach
and before the event causing impossibility, the measure
of damages in all probability would have been based upon
the entire term of the contract. See 4 CoRBn, CONTRACTS
(1951) § 964; 5 ComIN, CONTRACTS (1951) § 1053. For further reference to impossibility see Note, Impossibility of
Performance Amounting To A Total FailureOf Consideration Due To Governmental Action, 18 Md. L. Rev. 254
(1959).

Criminal Law - Prosecutor's Remarks To Jury Relating
To Possible Parole Constitutes Reversible Error. Shoemaker v. State, 228 Md. 462, 180 A. 2d 682 (1962). The
defendant was indicted for rape, found guilty, and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. In his argument to the
jury, the State's Attorney, in asking for a verdict of guilty
without capital punishment, commented on the possibility
of defendant's release on parole after, or perhaps even
before, the defendant (if convicted) had served one-third
of whatever term of imprisonment might be imposed. He
further referred to the obligation of the Parole Board to
consider the defendant's eligibility for parole after he had
served one-third of his sentence. An objection to these
comments was overruled. The Maryland Court of Appeals
held that these comments exceeded the limits of permissible comment since they suggested to the jury that it might
in part shift its responsibility for a finding of defendant's
guilt to some other body.
The Court reasoned that the jury might resolve any
question about defendant's guilt with the thought that,
even if it made a mistake, no great harm would be done
since he might soon be paroled. In a number of cases from
other jurisdictions where the jury has some function in
fixing the penalty of the defendant (including jury dis-
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cretion in imposing the death penalty or life imprisonment) similar remarks relating to such things as pardon,
executive clemency or parole, have been held to be permissible. See e.g., Sullivan v. State, 47 Ariz. 224, 55 P.
2d 312, 318 (1936); People v. Linden, 52 Cal. 2d 1, 338 P.
2d 397, 409 (1959) (result changed by California Penal
Code § 190.1 which permits such remarks only after conviction); McLendon v. State, 205 Ga. 675, 52 S.E. 2d 294
(1949) (result changed by a subsequent statute - see
discussion in McGruder v. State, 213 Ga. 259, 98 S.E. 2d
564, 569-570 (1957)); 23A C.J.S. 208, Criminal Law,
§ 1107; contra, see Commonwealth v. Mills, 350 Pa. 478,
39 A. 2d 572 (1944) (relating to the trial court's instructions). Where the jury does not have a function in fixing the
penalty several jurisdictions have held such remarks are improper. See e.g., Blackwell v. State, 76 Fla. 124, 70 So. 731
(1918) (prosecutor's comments relating to the possibility of
the jury's error being corrected by the defendant's right to
appeal, and possible future action of the board of pardons);
People v. Klapperich, 370 Ill. 588, 19 N.E. 2d 579 (1939);
State v. Kaempfer, 342 Mo. 1007, 119 S.W. 2d 294 (1938).
In the instant case the Court, by way of dictum, indicated
that such remarks are improper, whether or not the jury
has some function in fixing the penalty, on the ground the
prosecutor's arguments should be based upon the evidence.
Supra, pp. 468-469. See also Wood v. State, 192 Md. 643,
652, 65 A. 2d 316 (1949); Toomer v. State, 112 Md. 285,
292-293, 76 A. 118 (1910). However, since the prosecutor
was seeking a verdict of guilty without capital punishment, the Court said that cases where the jury has no
function in fixing the penalty were apposite. For further
reference see 53 AM. JuR. 372, Trial, § 466; 132 A.L.R. 679
(1941).

Eminent Domain - County Liable For "Taking" Of Air
Easement Over Property Adjacent To Airport Runway.
Griggs v. County of Allegheny, Pa., 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
Respondent county owned and operated an airport, designed for public use in accordance with the rules and
regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Administration under
the provisions of the National Airport Plan, 49 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1101 et seq. The plan authorized the Civil Aeronautics
Administrator to make grants to local governmental
agencies for the purpose of developing public airports. In
order to have its project approved for subsidization, the
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county agreed to abide by C.A.A. regulations to, "maintain a master plan of the airport .. . [and] acquire such
easements or other interests in lands and airspace as may
be necessary . . .", supra, p. 86. The airport plan, as approved by the C.A.A., included an approach area which
passed 11.36 feet above petitioner's chimney. Petitioner
brought suit against the county. A board of viewers appointed by the trial court found that flights interfered
with the petitioner's use and enjoyment of his home and
that there had been a "taking" of an air easement over
petitioner's property by the county and assessed damages
of $12,000. On an appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that even if there were a "taking" of an air
easement within the meaning of United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256 (1958), noted, 8 Md. L. Rev. 300 (1944), the
county was not liable. The Supreme Court of the United
States granted certiorari and subsequently reversed, holding that the county, which had selected the location, built
the airport, and now promoted, owned and operated the
air transport facilities, was liable for a "taking" in the
constitutional sense, and neither the airlines-lessees nor
the federal government took anything. Justices Black and
Frankfurter dissented.
The Causby case, which involved military aircraft and
an airport operated by the federal government, pronounced
the rule as to when low flights will result in a "taking" of
an air easement. The rule has been applied in cases where
municipal or county governments or local governmental
agencies own and operate the airports, and commercial
aircraft are involved. Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55
Wash. 2d 400, 348 P. 2d 664, 77 A.L.R. 2d 1344 (1960), 20
Md. L. Rev. 184 (1960); Johnson v. Airport Authority of
City of Omaha, 173 Neb. 801, 115 N.W. 2d 426 (1962).
Under the facts of the Causby case, liability could only
fall upon the federal government; however, where governmental bodies and commercial airlines are involved, the
law regarding assessment of damages to the proper party
defendant has been unsettled. See Note, Airplane Noise:
Problem In Tort Law and Federalism, 74 Harv. L. Rev.
1581, 1585 (1961). Owners of aircraft have been held individually liable under a trespass theory, or as joint tortfeasors under a nuisance theory. See supra, 74 Harv. L.
Rev. 1581 (1961). Also, the airport owner has been held
liable under a nuisance theory (see e.g., City of Phoenix
v. Harlan, 75 Ariz. 290, 255 P. 2d 609 (1953)), and for a
"taking" (Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, supra; Johnson v.
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Airport Authority of City of Omaha, supra and see generally, Mutual Chemical Co. v. Baltimore, Daily Record,
Jan. 27, 1939 (Md. 1939) ). Where the commercial airlines
are also party defendants it may be argued that they
should not be held liable under either a nuisance or trespass theory and clearly not for a taking, and that governmental airport owners should be solely liable under the
theory that a "taking" has occurred. See supra, 74 Harv.
L. Rev. 1581, 1587 (1961). The reason for the above argument is that the commercial airlines have no choice but to
use the approaches as designed and the municipality should
condemn sufficient land as required by the National Airport Plan. See dicta in Cheskov v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash.
2d 416, 348 P. 2d 673, 678 (1960). Carrying the theory of
the airport authority's liability one step further, the dissenting justices reasoned that congressional regulation of
airport development is so far reaching as to warrant
holding the federal government responsible for the entire
cost of acquiring air easements and not just for reimbursement of local public agencies up to the limits set
forth in the National Airport Plan. Cf. Calkins, The Landowner and The Aircraft - 1958, 25 J. Air Law 373, 378
(1958); Harvey, Landowner's Rights in the Air Age: The
Airport Dilemma, 56 Mich. L. Rev. 1313, 1326 (1958). See:
1 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 1A, §§ 7, 8, 13; 1 M.L.E., Aeronautics, § 12; 11 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (3d
ed. 1950) §§ 32.26, 32.43, 32.83; 77 A.L.R. 2d 1355, 1362
(1961); and notes to the instant case: 30 Ford. L. Rev. 803
(1962); 57 N.W. L. Rev. 346 (1962).

Evidence - Counsel Permitted To Impeach Own Witness. United States v. Freeman, 302 F. 2d 347 (2d Cir.
1962). The defendant appealed his conviction for violation
of the United States narcotics laws, contending, inter alia,
that the trial judge erred in advising the defense counsel,
prior to examining the defendant and during the examination of the narcotics agents, that he would not be permitted
to impeach the testimony of the agents whom he had called
in an attempt to show that they had "framed" the defendant. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, in affirming the conviction, rejected the defendant's contention. The Court reached this conclusion because the trial judge, despite his "erroneous and ill-advised"
cautionary remarks, did not in fact restrict questioning of
the narcotics agents and admitted the testimony of the
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defendant and his wife, which contradicted that of the
agents previously examined by the defense. The Court,
without distinguishing impeachment by direct examination from extrinsic impeachment stated "[w]e do not limit
our repudiation of the pernicious rule against impeachment
of one's own witness to instances in which the witness is
an 'adverse party' or 'hostile'." Supra, p. 351.
At early common law a litigant was not permitted to
produce testimony which would refute that previously
rendered by his own witnesses. This rule was based upon
the belief that a party should be bound by his witnesses'
statements, should guarantee their credibility, and should
not possess the means of coercing their testimony. 3 WiGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940 §§ 896-899. The modern authorities on the law of evidence have sharply criticized
this rule since its effect is to restrict the presentation of
relevant evidence. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE (1954) § 38;
MORGAN, BAsic PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE (1963) Ch. 3, 69-71;
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942), Rule 106; see also Johnson
v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 208 F. 2d 633 (3d Cir. 1953).
However in Maryland, the general rule against impeachment of one's own witnesses (apparently without attaching
significance to whether another witness would be called
in the impeaching process) has been upheld in recent cases.
Born v. Hammond, 218 Md. 184, 146 A. 2d 44 (1958);
Eisenhower v. Balto. Transit Co., 190 Md. 528, 59 A. 2d 313
(1948). But Maryland permits impeachment of one's own
witness if he is an adverse party, or, in certain cases, an
adverse party's agent (under 4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 35,
§ 9), or if his testimony constitutes a surprise to, or an
entrapment of, the party who called him. (See Gray v.
State, 219 Md. 557, 150 A. 2d 221 (1959); Bruce v. State,
218 Md. 87, 145 A. 2d 428 (1958) MD. RuLEs (1961) Rule
413a (1) (use of deposition).) For further discussion and
reference, see: 23 M.L.E., Witnesses, §§ 133, 162; Kauffman,
Impeachment And Rehabilitation Of Witnesses In Maryland, 7 Md. L. Rev. 118 (1943); Note, Impeachment By A
Party Of His Own Witness, 4 Md. L. Rev. 193 (1940).

Pleading - Remand Without Affirmance Or Reversal
Under Maryland Rule 871 a. Fletcher v. Havre De Grace
Fireworks Company, 229 Md. 196, 183 A. 2d 386 (1962).
On appeal, the judgment of the trial court sustaining the
defendants' demurrers was affirmed. Fletcher v. Havre De
Grace Fireworks Company, 229 Md. 196, 177 A. 2d 908

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXIII

(1962). Before the mandate was issued, plaintiff petitioned
the Court of Appeals to modify its opinion by striking out
the affirmance of the judgment for costs and in lieu thereof
to remand the case under Md. Rule 871 a to permit
amendment of the declaration and for further proceedings.
Under Md. Rule 871 a, if it shall appear to the Court that
the "purposes of justice will be advanced by permitting
further proceedings," the Court of Appeals may remand
without affirming or reversing. Plaintiff alleged she had
acquired additional facts which would enable her to state
a cause of action against the defendants. (Plaintiffs in
eleven other cases, by stipulation, were bound by the decision in the instant case.) The Court of Appeals held (4-3)
that the original opinion should be modified and the case
remanded without affirmance or reversal so the trial court
could decide whether amendment should be allowed.
The majority reasoned that the Rule is equitable in
nature and that refusal to grant this plaintiff relief would
be unfair to the plaintiffs in the eleven other cases. The
dissent, written by Chief Judge Brune, noted that the
statutory source of the Rule [1 MD. CODE (1951) Art. 5,
§ 42] had been construed as requiring that the cause for
invoking it must be indicated by the record. Smith v.
Hooper, 95 Md. 16, 36, 54 A. 95 (1902); General Ins. Co.
v. U.S. Ins. Co., 10 Md. 517, 528 (1857). The Chief Judge
expressed himself as unable to distinguish between the
relief here granted and remanding for a new trial on the
basis of newly discovered evidence, a practice which the
Court of Appeals has consistently avoided except in certain well-defined types of cases; and he indicated his concern as to how the Court would handle the matter when
next faced with a petition for a new trial on this basis.
Moreover, the dissent stated the unfairness, if any, to the
plaintiffs in the other cases was "self-inflicted" and was
irrelevant in the determination of the question presented
by this plaintiff. For further reference see 2 M.L.E., Appeals, § 502.

